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Abstract—Technical Support Scams (TSS), which combine
online abuse with social engineering over the phone channel,
have persisted despite several law enforcement actions. The
tactics used by these scammers have evolved over time and they
have targeted an ever increasing number of technology brands.
Although recent research has provided important insights into
TSS, these scams have now evolved to exploit ubiquitously used
online services such as search and sponsored advertisements
served in response to search queries. We use a data-driven
approach to understand search-and-ad abuse by TSS to gain
visibility into the online infrastructure that facilitates it. By
carefully formulating tech support queries with multiple search
engines, we collect data about both the support infrastructure
and the websites to which TSS victims are directed when they
search online for tech support resources. We augment this with a
DNS-based amplification technique to further enhance visibility
into this abuse infrastructure. By analyzing the collected data,
we provide new insights into search-and-ad abuse by TSS and
reinforce some of the findings of earlier research. Further, we
demonstrate that tech support scammers are (1) successful in
getting major as well as custom search engines to return links
to websites controlled by them, and (2) they are able to get ad
networks to serve malicious advertisements that lead to scam
pages. Our study period of approximately eight months uncovered
over 9,000 TSS domains, of both passive and aggressive types,
with minimal overlap between sets that are reached via organic
search results and sponsored ads. Also, we found over 2,400
support domains which aid the TSS domains in manipulating
organic search results. Moreover, to our surprise, we found very
little overlap with domains that are reached via abuse of domain
parking and URL-shortening services which was investigated
previously. Thus, investigation of search-and-ad abuse provides
new insights into TSS tactics and helps detect previously unknown
abuse infrastructure that facilitates these scams.
I. INTRODUCTION
The Technical Support Scam (TSS), in which scammers
dupe their victims into sending hundreds of dollars for fake
technical support services, is now almost a decade old. It
started with scammers making cold calls to victims claiming
to be a legitimate technology vendor but has now evolved into
the use of sophisticated online abuse tactics to get customers to
call phone numbers that are under the control of the scammers.
In their pioneering research on TSS [54], Miramirkhani et.
al. explored both the web infrastructure used by tech support
scammers and the tactics used by them when a victim called
a phone number advertised on a TSS website. They focused
on TSS websites reached via malicious advertisements that are
served by abusing domain parking and ad-based URL shorten-
ing services. Although their work provided important insights
into how these services are abused by TSS, it has recently
become clear that tech support scammers are diversifying their
methods of reaching victims and the ways with which they
convince these victims to call them on their advertised phone
numbers.
Specifically, recent reports by the FTC and by search
engines vendors suggest that scammers are turning to search
engine results and the ads shown on search-results pages as
novel ways of reaching victim users [11], [31], [5]. These new
channels not only allow them to reach a wider audience but
also allow them to diversify the ways with which they attempt
to convince users to call them. As shown in Figure 1, several
actions have been taken to stop TSS but these scams continue
to adapt and evade both law enforcement and technical safe-
guards.
In this paper, we perform the first systematic study of these
novel search-and-ad abuse channels. We develop a model for
generating tech-support related queries and use the resulting
2,600 queries as daily searches in popular and less popular
search engines. By crawling the organic search results and
ads shown as a response to our queries (note that we follow
a methodology that allows us to visit the websites of ads
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Fig. 1: Timeline of some news events related to search-based technical support scams (TSS).
Fig. 2: Screenshot from Goentry.com on July 1st, 2016.
without participating in click-fraud), we discover thousands of
domains and phone numbers associated with technical support
scams. In addition to the traditional aggressive variety of
technical support scams (where the pages attempt to scare
users into calling them, part of Figure 3), we observe a large
number of passive technical support scam pages which appear
to be professional, yet nevertheless are operated by technical
support scammers (Figures 2, 3 show examples of such scams).
Using network-amplification techniques, we show how we can
discover many more scam pages present on the same network
infrastructure, and witness the co-location of aggressive with
passive scam pages. This indicates that a fraction of these
aggressive/passive scams are, in fact, controlled and operated
by the same scammers. We also discover that the lifetime
of passive scam pages is significantly larger than aggressive
scam pages and find that our collected scams have little-to-
no overlap with the scams identified by Miramirkhani et al.’s
system during the same period of time. This indicates that our
t1 t2
Fig. 3: Screenshot from Bing.com on Feb 2nd, 2017.
system reveals a large part of the TSS ecosystem that remained,
up until now, unexplored.
Our main contributions are the following:
• We design the first search-engine-based system for
discovering technical support scams, and utilize it
for eight months to uncover more than 9,000 TSS-
related domains and 3,365 phone numbers operated
by technical support scammers, present in both organic
search results as well as ads located on search-results
pages. We analyze the resulting data and provide de-
tails of the abused infrastructure, the SEO techniques
that allow scammers to rank well on search engines,
and the long-lived support domains which allow TSS
domains to remain hidden from search engines.
• We find that scammers are complementing their ag-
gressive TSS pages with passive ones, which both
cater to different audiences and, due to their non-
apparent malice, have a significantly longer lifetime.
We show that well-known network amplification tech-
niques allow detection systems to not only discover
more TSS domains but to also trace both aggressive
and passive TSS back to the same actors.
• We compare our results with the ones from the
recent TSS study of Miramirkhani et al. [54] and
show that the vast majority of our discovered abusive
infrastructure is not detected by prior work, allowing
defenders to effectively double their coverage of TSS
abuse infrastructure by incorporating our techniques
into their existing TSS-discovering systems.
II. METHODOLOGY
We utilize a data-driven methodology to explore TSS
tactics and infrastructure that is used to support search-and-
ad abuse. To do this, we search and crawl the web to collect
a variety of data about TSS websites, and use network-level
information to further amplify such data. Our system, which
is shown in Figure 4, implements TSS data collection and
analysis functions, and consists of the following six modules:
1) The Seed Generator module generates phrases that
are likely to be used in search queries to find tech
support resources. It uses a known corpus of TSS
webpages obtained from Malwarebytes [24] and a
probabilistic language modeling technique to gener-
ate phrases that serve as input to search queries.
2) Using search phrases, the Search Engine Crawler
(SEC) module mines search engines including pop-
ular ones such as Google, Bing, and Yahoo! for
technical support related content appearing via search
results (SRs) and sponsored advertisements (ADs).
We also mine a few obscure ones such as goentry.com
and search.1and1.com that we discovered are used by
tech support scammers. The SR and AD URIs are
candidates for active crawling.
3) The Active Crawler Module (ACM) then tracks and
records the URI redirection events, HTML content,
and DNS information associated with the URIs/do-
mains appearing in the ADs and SRs crawled by the
SEC module.
4) Categorization module which includes a well-trained
Technical Support Content Classifier (TSSC), is used
to identify TSS SRs and ADs using the retrieved
content.
5) The Network Amplification Module (NAM) uses DNS
data to amplify signals obtained from the labeled
TSS domains, such as the host IP, to expand the
set of domains serving TSS, using an amplification
algorithm.
6) Lastly, using the information gathered about TSS
domains, the Clustering Module groups together do-
mains sharing similar attributes at the network and
application level.
A. Search Phrase Seed Generator
Selecting appropriate queries to feed the search engine
crawler module is critical for obtaining suitable quality, cover-
age and representativeness for TSS web content. To do this, we
n # ngrams Example English Phrase
1 74 virus
2 403 router support
3 1,082 microsoft tech support
4 720 microsoft online support chat
5 243 technical support for windows vista
6 72 hp printers technical support phone number
7 6 contact norton antivirus customer service
phone number
Total 2,600 english phrases
TABLE I: Summary and examples of generated n-grams related to
technical support scams.
must generate phrases that are highly likely to be associated
with the content shown or advertised in TSS webpages. De-
riving relevant search queries from a context specific corpus
has been used effectively in the past for measuring search-
redirection attacks [52]. We use an approach based on joint
probability of words in phrases in a given text corpus [53].
We start with a corpus of 500 known technical support
scam websites from the Malwarebytes technical support (TSS)
domain blacklist (DBL) [24], whose content was available. We
were able to find 869 unigrams or single words after sanitizing
the content in the corpus for stop words. We further reduce
the number of single words or unigrams by only considering
words that appear in more than 10 websites. This leaves us
with 74 unique words. Using the raw counts of unigrams,
we compute the raw bi-gram probabilities of eligible phrases
with the chain rule of probability. We then use the Markov
assumption to approximate n-gram probabilities [25]. Once
we have probabilities of all phrases up to n-grams, we use
a probability threshold λn to pick phrases having probability
of occurrence greater than the threshold for each value of n.
In effect, we develop a language model pertinent to technical
support scam websites.
Table I shows the total number of phrases found for
different values of n and some examples of the phrases found.
We restricted the value of n to 7, as the value of n = 8 did
not yield any phrases that would be logical as search engine
inputs to find online technical support scams. As we can see,
n = 3 yields a lot of popular phrases used in online technical
support scams. In total, we were able to identify 2600 English
phrases that serve as search queries to the SEC module.
B. Search Engine Crawler (SEC) Module
The SEC module uses a variety of search engines and
the search phrases generated from the TSS corpus to capture
two types of listing: traditional search results, sometimes also
referred to as organic search results, and search advertisements,
sometimes also referred to as paid/sponsored advertisements.
Both Google [14] and Bing [9] provide APIs that can be
used to get SRs. However, some of the search engines we
considered did not have well documented APIs and vanilla
crawlers are either blocked or not shown content such as ADs.
In such cases, we automate the process using PhantomJS [26],
a headless WebKit “scriptable” with a JavaScript API. It allows
us to capture a search page with both SR and AD listings as it
would be shown to a real user visiting the search engine from
a real browser.
Fig. 4: Cross-Channel TSS threat collection and analysis system.
Once we have the raw page p from the search engine in
response to a query q, we use straighforward CSS selectors to
separate the SRs from ADs. A SR object typically consists of
basic components such as the the SR title, the SR URI, and a
short snippet of the SR content. An AD object too, typically
consists of these components, i.e. the AD title, the advertiser’s
URI/domain name, and a short descriptive text. The advertiser
also provides the URI the user should be directed to when the
AD is clicked. In addition, an AD may also consist of an AD
extension component which allows actions to be performed
after the AD is rendered (e.g. call extensions that allow the
advertiser to embed a phone number as a clickable call button).
The main difference between the contents displayed in SRs and
ADs is that the content shown in the former is what is seen
by the search engine crawler whereas the content in the latter
is provided directly by the advertiser. The SR/AD along with
its components are logged into a database as a JSON object.
The URI component of the ADs and SRs are then inserted
into the ADC (AD crawling) and SRC (SR crawling) queues
respectively, which then coordinate with the ACM to gather
more information about them, as discussed next.
C. Active Crawler Module (ACM)
The ACM uses the ADC and SRC URI queues to gather
more information relevant to an AD/SR. ACM has three
submodules that keep track of the following information for
each URI seen in the AD/SR: (i) URI tracking, (ii) HTML
and Screenshot Capture, and (iii) DNS information. We now
discuss each of the submodules corresponding to these.
URI Tracker: The purpose of the URI tracker is to follow
and log the redirection events starting from the URI component
seen in the AD/SR discussed in the previous module. Barring
user clicks, our goal is to capture the sequence of events
that a real-world user on a real browser would experience
when directed to technical support scams from SR/AD results,
and automate this process. Our system uses a combination of
python modules PhantomJS [26], Selenium [27] and Beautiful-
Soup [6] to script a light-weight headless browser. Finally, to
ensure wide coverage, we configure our crawlers with different
combinations of Referer headers and User-Agents (we discuss
the exact settings in Section III). Next, we discuss briefly how
automating URI tracking (and other related events) can pose
ethical challenges in the case of ADs and how we handle them.
Mimicking AD Clicks: When a user clicks on
an AD, the click triggers a sequence of events in
which the publisher, AD network and advertiser are
involved, before the user lands on the intended webpage
associated with the AD. This can be attributed to the
way monetization model behind ADs work [44]. For
example, the domain name shown in an AD could be
gosearch770.xyz while the source URI associated with it is
hXXp://54080586.r.msn.com/?ld=d3S-92sO4zd0
&u=www.gosearch770.xyz%2findex.php. Clicking
on the AD may result in the flow of money from the
advertiser to the AD network and publisher depending on the
charging model such as Cost-per-click (CPC) or Pay-per-click
(PPC). Clearly, the intent of our automated crawlers is not
to interfere with this monetization model by introducing
extraneous clicks. One alternative to actually clicking on
the ADs and a way to bypass the AD network is to visit
the advertiser’s domain name directly, while maintaining the
Referer to be the search engine displaying the AD. In theory,
any further redirections from the advertiser’s domain should
still be captured.
We chose the strategy that follows the advertiser’s domain
while ensuring that the same path (URIs and domain names)
that leads to the technical support scam webpage is followed
as if we had clicked on the AD. To validate if this was a
viable option while maintaining accuracy of the data collection
process, we conducted a controlled experiment in which we
compared a small number of recorded URI resolution paths
generated by real clicks to paths recorded while visiting the
advertiser’s domain name directly. We did this for the same set
of technical support ADs while keeping the same browser and
IP settings. For a set of 50 fake technical support ADs from
different search engines identified manually and at random,
these paths were found to be identical. This gives us confidence
that accurate URI tracking information can be collected for
fake technical support ADs without affecting the originating
AD networks. For SRs, we just simulate a click on the SR
and follow the SR URI component of the SR object. Thus, the
outcome of this submodule is the URI redirection path which
includes the fully qualified domains (FQDNs) encountered and
the method of redirection for both ADs and SRs.
HTML Crawler: The HTML crawler works in conjunction
with the URI Tracker. This crawler captures both the raw
HTML as well as visual screenshots of webpages shown
after following the ADs and SRs. For each domain d and
webpage p, in the path from an AD/SR to the final landing
webpage, the crawler stores the full source html and an image
of the webpage as it would have appeared in a browser,
into a database. It uses a combination of the domain name
and timestamp as identifiers for this data, so that it can be
easily referenced when needed. The content generated from
this module is used in various other modules/submodules in
order to decide the threat level of the AD/SR and whether it
is a fake technical support AD/SR (Section II-D); extract the
toll-free number used (if any); and to cluster campaigns of
technical support scams (Section II-F).
Active DNS Crawler: For each domain, d, in the path
from an AD/SR to the final landing domain, the active DNS
crawler logs the IP address, ip, associated with the domain to
form a (d, ip, t) triplet, based on the DNS resolution process
at the time of crawling, t. This information is valuable for
unearthing new technical support scam domains (Section II-E)
and in studying the network infrastructure associated with
cross-channel technical support scams (Section IV).
D. Categorization Module
Although we input technical support phrases to search
engines with the aim of finding fake technical support websites,
it is possible and even likely that some SRs and ADs lead to
websites that are genuine technical support or sometimes even
completely unrelated to technical support (i.e. non-technical
support). The purpose of this module is to identify the TSS
search listings while, at the same time, categorizing the re-
maining search listings for further analysis.
TSS Landing Page Categories: To categorize all search
engine listings obtained during the period of data collection,
we first divide the URIs collected from both ADs and SRs into
two high-level categories: TSS and Non-TSS, (i.e. those URIs
that lead to technical support scam pages and those that lead
to benign or unrelated pages). Within each category, we have
subcategories: TSS URIs are further separated into those lead-
ing to aggressive TSS websites and those leading to passive
TSS websites, as mentioned previously. Prior work [54] only
focused on aggressive TSS pages but we found that search-
and-ad abuse also makes use of passive landing pages which
have different modus operandi, and are worth exploring.
Categorization Method: To identify the actual TSS web-
sites, we utilize the following multi-step process:
1) We remove high reputation domains using the Alexa
top websites list [4]. It is possible that a high rep-
utation domain is compromised or abused and fake-
technical support content is dropped into the website
directory but we leave the detection of such unlikely
instances for future work. This allows us to avoid
certain types of false positives, such as flagging Best
Buy’s Geek Squad [12] as a technical support scam.
2) We only retain ADs and SRs whose URL paths
lead to final landing pages containing toll-free phone
numbers. It is possible for fake-technical support
scammers to use phone numbers that are non-toll free
but we argue why toll-free numbers make a balanced
investment for scammers in Section III-E.
3) Finally, we classify ADs/SRs as technical support or
not using the TSS Webpage Classifier, discussed next.
This helps weed out non-technical support websites
such as blogs, complaint forums etc. which may
contain some content (even toll-free numbers) related
to technical support (which is perhaps why they
appeared in the SRs/ADs in the first place).
TSS Webpage Classifier: We determine an AD/SR as
technical support or not based on the webpage content shown
in the final landing domain corresponding to an AD/SR. We
leverage the observation that a lot of fake technical support
websites use highly similar content, language and words to
present themselves. This can be represented as a feature vector
where features are the words and values are the frequency
counts of those words. Thus, for a collection of labeled
technical support and non-technical support webpages, we can
extract the bag of words after sanitization (such as removing
stop words), and create a matrix of feature vectors where the
rows are the final landing domains and the columns are the
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Fig. 5: ROC Curve of the Technical Support Webpage Classifier. The
model achieves 99.33% AUC with 98.9% TPR and 1.5% FPR at a
threshold of 0.6.
features. We can then train a classifier on these features which
can be used to automatically label future webpages.
To that effect, we built a model using the Naive Bayes
classification algorithm with 10-fold cross validation on a set
comprising of 500 technical support and 500 non-technical
support webpages identified from the first few weeks of
ADs/SRs data. The performance of the classifier is captured in
the ROC Curve shown in Figure 5. We see that a threshold of
0.6 yields to an acceptable true positive rate (sensitivity/recall)
of 98.9% and a false positive rate (1-specificity) of 1.5%.
Moreover the area under the curve (AUC), which is a measure
of the overall accuracy of the trained model, is 99.33% which
gives us confidence that the technical vs. non-technical support
webpage classification works well. The outcome at this stage,
after running it over new and incoming AD/SR data, is a set of
final landing technical support webpages originating from an
AD/SR. These webpages can be used to trace back and label
the associated AD/SR and its corresponding URLs/domain
names as relevant to fake technical support scams.
To further separate TSS URIs into those leading to pas-
sive/aggressive websites, we use the presence of features
extracted from the HTML of the landing TSS website. Ag-
gressive TSS webpages exhibit behavior that contributes to
a false sense of urgency and panic through a combination
of audio messages describing the problem and continuous
pop-up messages/dialogue loops. On the other hand, passive
TSS websites adopt the approach of seeming genuine. This
is accomplished by using simple textual content, certifica-
tions, seals, and other brand-based images. They often present
themselves as official tech support representatives of large
companies and, because of their non-apparent malice (one
would have to call these numbers to realize that they belong to
scammers) pose new challenges for the detection of TSS [5].
Because of these differences in aggressive and passive TSS
webpages, we look for javascript associated with pop-up dia-
logues, such as, window.alert(), window.confirm(),
and window.prompt() as well as HTML <audio> tags to
identify the aggressive ones.
Although, in this work we are primarily interested in URIs
leading to TSS websites, we also bucket AD/SR URIs that
lead to non-TSS websites. We do this to give the reader a
sense of all search listings appearing next to technical support
related search queries. The subcategories include legitimate
technical support websites, blogs/forums containing spam or
mentioning technical support related matters, complaint web-
sites containing technical support related posts, news websites
with technical support content and an “uncategorized” bucket
containing everything else.
E. Network Amplification Module
Using search listings to identify active TSS websites works
well for creating an initial level of intelligence around these
scams. However, it may be possible to expand this intelligence
to uncover more domains supporting TSS that may have been
missed by our crawler (possibly because the domains were not
actively participating in AD or SEO activity at the time). These
domains may be dormant, perhaps, waiting to be circulated at
a later stage. However, the give-away for these additional TSS
domains could be the sharing of network-level infrastructure
with already identified TSS domains. Once we have a set of
labeled final-landing domains,Df−tss, related to fake technical
support websites originating from ADs/SRs, we leverage the
properties of the Domain Name System (DNS) to find more
fake technical support websites via an amplification process
which works as follows.
A DNS request results in a domain name, d, being resolved
to an IP address, ip, at a particular time, t, forming a (d, ip, t)
tuple. For each domain, d ∈ Df−tss, we compute two sets:
(i) RHIP (d), which is a set of all IPs that have mapped
to domain d as recorded by the DNS Crawler (Section II-C)
within time window T , and (ii)RHDN(ip), which is the set of
domains that have historically been linked with the ip or ip/24
subnet in the RHIP set within time window T ±∆, where ∆
is also a unit of time (typically one week). Next, we compute
Drhip−rhdn(d), which represents all the domains related to d
at the network level, as discovered by the RHIP -RHDN
expansion. Now, for each domain d′ ∈ Drhip−rhdn(d), we
check if the webpage wd′ associated with it is a TSS webpage
using the classifier module, Section II-D. If it is true, we
add d′ to an amplification set, D′f−tss(d), associated with d.
The cardinality of the eventual amplification set gives us the
amplification factor, A(d). Finally, we define the expanded
set of TSS domains, Ef−tss, as the union of all amplification
sets. Combining the initial set of domains, Df−tss, with the
expanded set, Ef−tss, gives us the final set of fake-technical
support domains Ff−tss.
The data pertaining to historic DNS resolutions comes from
the ActiveDNS Project [3], while the webpages associated
with the new domains are obtained by the active HTML
crawler module (Section II-C) and, when required, the Internet
archive [39]. The final technical support domain set is pro-
cessed further for analysis.
F. Clustering Module
The purpose of the clustering module is to identify different
TSS campaigns. For example, one campaign may offer tech-
nical support for Microsoft whereas another one may target
Apple users. We identify the campaigns by finding clusters of
related domain names associated with abuse in a given time
period or epoch t. Once we have the final set of TSS domains,
a two step hierarchical clustering process is used. In the first
level, referred to as Network CLustering (NCL), we cluster
together domain names based on the network infrastructure
properties. In the second level, referred to as Application
CLustering (ACL), we further separate the network level
clusters based on the application level web content associated
with the domains in them. This process allows us to produce
high quality clusters that can then be labeled with campaign
tags.
In order to execute these two different clustering steps, we
employ the most common statistical features from the areas
of DNS [41] and HTML [61], [64] modeling to build our
feature vector. This feature vector embeds network information
about not just the final landing domain d, but also of all the
domains supporting d, based on the redirection path to d. The
vector also captures the agility of the domains: if d resolved
to multiple different IPs over time, this information would be
present. We use Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) [67]
to reduce the dimensionality of the sparse feature matrix,
and the network clustering module then uses the X-Means
clustering algorithm [58] to cluster domains having similar
network-level properties. To further refine the clusters, we use
features extracted from the full HTML source of the web
pages associated with domains in Ff−tss. We compute TF-IDF
statistical vector on the bag of words on each cluster c [61].
Since the matrix is expected to be quite sparse, the application
cluster submodule performs dimensionality reduction using
SVD, like in NCL. Once we have the reduced application
based feature vectors representing corresponding domains, this
module too uses the X-Means clustering algorithm to cluster
domains hosting similar content.
Campaign Labels: This submodule is used to label clus-
ters with keywords that are representative of a campaign’s
theme. Let C be a cluster produced after NCL and ACL,
and let DC be the set of domains in the cluster. For each
domain d ∈ DC , we create a set U(d, T ) that consists
of all the parts of the domain name d except the effective
top level domain (eTLD) and all parts of the corresponding
webpage title T , e.g. U(‘abc.exampledomain.com’, ‘title’) =
{abc, exampledomain, title}. Next, we compute the set of
words W (U(d)) using the Viterbi algorithm [45]. There-
fore, W(U(‘abc.exampledomain.com’, ‘title’)) = {example,
domain, title} since ‘abc’ is not a valid English word or
W(U(‘virusinfection0x225.site’, ’System Shutdown Call 877-
563-1632’)) = {virus, infection, system, shutdown, call}. Using
W, we increment the frequency counter for the word ‘example’,
‘domain’ and ‘title’ in a cluster specific dictionary. In this
manner, after iterating over all domains in the cluster, we get
a keyword to frequency mapping from which we pick the top
most frequent word(s) to attribute to the cluster. Identifying
campaigns this way allows us to study properties related to
the campaign more readily.
III. RESULTS
We built and deployed the system described in Section II
to collect and analyze SR and AD domains for TSS. Although
the system continues to be in operation, the results discussed
in this section are based on data that was collected over a total
period of 8 months in two distinct time windows, April 1 to
August 31, 2016 initially, and again between Jan 1 - Mar 31,
2017, to study the long running nature of TSS.
Advertisments (AD) Search Results (SR) AD+SR
URIs Domains URIs Domains Domains
# % # % # % # % # %
TSS 10,299 71.79 2,132 43.04 59,500 54.26 3,583 17.51 5,134 22.13
Aggressive∗ 7,423 51.74 1,224 24.71 45,567 41.55 2,281 11.15 3,166 13.65
Passive 2,876 20.05 908 18.33 13,933 12.71 1,302 6.36 1,968 8.48
Non-TSS 4,047 28.21 2,822 56.96 50,157 45.74 16,880 82.49 18,061 77.87
Legitimate 1,892 13.19 1,442 29.10 3,726 3.39 3,499 17.09 3,790 16.34
Blogs/Forums 0 0.00 0 0.00 10,012 9.13 3,001 14.67 3,001 12.94
Complaint Websites 0 0.00 0 0.00 9,998 9.12 202 0.99 202 0.87
News 0 0.00 0 0.00 12,113 11.05 1,208 5.90 1,208 5.21
Uncategorized 2,155 15.02 1,380 27.86 14,308 13.05 8,970 43.84 9,860 42.51
Total 14,346 100.00 4,954 100.00 109,657 100.00 20,463 100.00 23,195 100.00
TABLE II: Categorization of Search Results. ∗Includes FakeCall, FakeBSOD, TechBrolo etc.
Infrastructure Setup: We deploy two distinct nodes on a
university network where the SEC and ACM modules for data
collection run. One is a desktop class machine with 16GB
RAM, a 3.1 GHz quad-core Intel Core i5 processor that runs
Mac OS X 10.11. This node simultaneously runs the same
data collection code on a virtual machine with Windows Vista
guest OS. The other node is a server class machine with
32GB RAM, 8 Intel Xeon quad core processors that runs
the Debian 3.2.68 OS. We set the User Agent (UA) to be a
version of Chrome, Internet Explorer and the Firefox browser
respectively, covering the most commonly used browsers. The
Referer field is set based on the search engine to which the
process thread is attached. We clear the cookie field every
time we query a search engine or make a request to an
AD/SR URI. The IP addresses of the nodes are static and
assigned from the university subnet. Previous studies [54] have
shown that it is more effective to perform such threat data
collection from university networks rather than from a public
cloud infrastructure. We made similar observations from an
experiment we conducted and chose the university network
for our work. To make sure that none of the search engine
operators throttle our crawlers, we rate limit the number of
queries sent each day to a particular search engine.
We crawled 5 search engines for both ADs and SRs, which
include Google.com, Bing.com, Yahoo.com, Goentry.com and
search.1and1.com. The first three are popular search engines
used daily by users while goentry was chosen because it has
been linked with browser hijacking and serving unwanted
ADs [28], [13]. The last search engine was added to the
list after we encountered regular references/links to it among
goentry ADs. Each day, the SEC module automatically sends
2,600 different queries, as discussed in Section II-A for tech-
nical support-related terms (e.g. microsoft tech support) to the
various search engines. It stores the AD and SR URIs returned.
We consider the top 100 SR URIs (unless there are fewer)
while recording all the AD URIs displayed for each query.
A. Dataset Summary
In total we collected 14,346 distinct AD URIs and 109,657
distinct SR URIs. Table II presents the breakdown of all the
search listings into the different categories. The AD URIs
mapped to 4,954 unique Fully Qualified Domain Names
(FQDNs), while the SR URIs mapped to 20,463 unique
FQDNs. Among the AD URIs, 10,299 (71.79%) were observed
as leading to TSS websites. This is a significant portion
and shows that ADs related to technical support queries are
dominated by those that lead to real scams. It also means
that the technical support scammers are actively bidding in
the AD ecosystem to flood the AD networks with rogue
technical support ADs, especially in response to technical
support queries. Such prevalence of TSS ADs is the reason
why Bing announced a blanket ban of online tech support
ADs on its platform [8] in mid-May, 2016. The TSS AD
URIs mapped to 2132 FQDNs. Among the TSS AD URIs
and corresponding FQDNs, we found the presence of both
aggressive and passive websites. More than two thirds of the
URIs were seen to lead to aggressive websites. The ratio
between aggressive and passive websites was closer to 4:3
when considering just the TSS AD FQDNs. Past research has
only investigated aggressive TSS websites, but our results show
that passive websites are also a serious problem.
We did observe legitimate technical support service AD
URIs and FQDNs. These comprised about 13.19% of all AD
URIs and 29.10% of all AD FQDNs. There were no ADs
that pointed to blogs/forums, complaint websites and news
sites. About 15% of the AD URIs remained uncategorized:
however, it is worth mentioning that on manual inspection,
one set of the URIs/domains seen in the uncategorized bucket
led to other shady (and perhaps temporary) search portals
such as govtsearches.com, finecomb.com, us.when.com and
many more. These search portals show more ADs and SRs in
response to the original search query. This pattern of creating
on-the-go search portals and linking them to each other via
ADs to form a nexus is intriguing and worthy of exploration
in itself. We leave this for future work.
Among the SR URIs, 59,500 (54.26%) were observed
leading to TSS websites. The URIs mapped to 3,583 (17.51%)
FQDNs. Among the TSS SR URIs, we again found the
presence of those leading to both aggressive and passive TSS
varieties. The sheer number of such URIs is surprising as,
unlike ADs, it is harder to manipulate popular search engine
algorithms to make rogue websites appear in search results.
However, as we discuss later, we observe that using black hat
SEO techniques, TSS actors are able to trick the search engine
ranking algorithms. Compared to ADs, we found that almost
76% TSS SR URIs lead to aggressive TSS websites while
the remaining lead to passive TSS websites, again pointing to
the prevalence of the common tactic of scare and sell [30].
Although TSS SR URIs were frequently seen interspersed
in search results, SR URIs also consisted of non-TSS ones.
Among these we observed 3.39% legitimate technical support
service URIs, 9.13% blog/forum URIs, 9.12% URIs linked to
complaint websites and 11.05% URIs pointing to news articles
(mostly on technical support scams). The remaining 13.05%
URIs were uncategorized.
We also report aggregate statistics for FQDNs after com-
bining ADs and SRs data. We see that in total there were
5134 TSS FQDNs found, with URIs corresponding to 3166
FQDNs leading to aggressive websites and 1968 leading to
passive websites. These together comprise of about 22.1% of
the total number, 23,195 FQDNs retrieved from the entire
dataset. One interesting observation is that majority of the
FQDNs seen in ADs were not seen in the SRs and vice versa,
with only a small amount of overlap in the TSS AD FQDNs
and TSS SR FQDNs, consisting of 581 FQDNs. It suggests
that the resources deployed for TSS ADs are different from
those appearing in TSS SRs.
Support and Final-landing TSS domains: The purpose
of support domains is to conduct black hat SEO and redirect
victims to TSS domains but not host TSS content directly. We
found 38.3% of the TSS search listing URIs did not redirect
to a domain different from the one in the initial URI, while
the remaining 61.7% redirected to a domain different from
the one in the initial URI. There were an additional, 2,435
support domains found. Moreover, one might expect the use
of popular URL shortening services such as bit.ly or goo.gl
for redirections and obfuscation, but this was rarely the case,
which we found surprising.
When a TSS URI appearing in the search listings is
clicked, it leads to the webpage that lures the victim into the
technical support scam. This webpage could be hosted on the
same domain as the domain of the URI, or on a different
domain. We refer to this final domain name associated with
the technical support scam webpage as the final landing TSS
domain. Furthermore, it is possible that the path from the
initial SR/AD URI to the final landing webpage consists of
other intermediate domains, which are mainly used for the
purpose of redirecting the victim’s browser. This is discussed in
Section II-C. Figure 6a plots the number of final-landing TSS
domains discovered by our system over time across the various
search engines. A bi-weekly trend shows that, across all search
engines, we are able to consistently find hundreds of final-
landing TSS domains and webpages. Bing, Google, Goentry,
Yahoo and search.1and1.com, all act as origination points to
technical support scam webpages. This suggests that these
specialized scammers are casting a wide net. Starting mid-
May 2016, we see a sudden dip in the number of TSS domains
found on Bing. We suspect that this is most likely correlated
to Bing’s blanket ban on technical support advertisements [8],
[7]. However, as we can see, activity, contributing mainly to
SR based TSS, picked up again during July, 2016, continuing
an upward trend in Jan to Mar 2017.
Goentry, which was a major source of technical support
ADs leading to final landing TSS domains during our initial
period of data collection saw a significant dip during the
second time window. We suspect this may be due to our data
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(a) Bi-weekly trend of the number of final landing TSS
domains found classified based on the search engine of
origination for the two time periods of data collection.
(b) Fraction of technical support phrases with the cor-
responding average global monthly searches on Google
during the months of threat data collection. Dataset
consists of both popular and not so popular search
phrases.
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(c) Relationship between popularity of a search phrase
and the TSS URI pollution levels in the search listings.
URI counts include AD and SR URI’s as seen on
Google. Phrases with popularity less than 100 average
hits per month ignored.
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(d) Distribution of TSS SR URIs based on the position
in search listings for different search engines.
Fig. 6: Measurements related to AD and SR listings
collection infrastructure being detected or law enforcement
actions against technical support scammers in India [18], [17],
which is where the website is registered. In total we were
able to discover 1,626 unique AD originated final landing TSS
FQDNs, and 2,682 unique SR originated final landing TSS
FQDNs. Together, we were able to account for 3,996 unique
final landing TSS FQDNs that mapped to 3,878 unique final
landing TSS TLD+1 domain names.
B. Search Phrases Popularity and SR Rankings
Since we use search queries to retrieve SRs and ADs,
one question is the popularity of search phrases used in these
queries which can serve as an indicator of how frequently they
are used to find tech support related websites. We use popu-
larity level derived from Google’s keyword planner tool [20]
that is offered as part of its AdWords program. The popularity
of a search phrase is measured in terms of the average number
of global monthly searches for the phrase during the time
period of data collection. Figure 6b shows the distribution of
technical support search phrases based on their popularity. We
can see that out of the 2600 phrases associated with TSS,
about one third (32.7%) were of very low popularity, e.g.
‘kaspersky phone support’ with less than 100 average global
monthly searches, one third (33.5%) were of low popularity,
e.g. ‘norton antivirus technical support’ with 101-1,000 hits
per month on average, while there were 25.1% phrases that
had medium levels of popularity, e.g. ‘hp tech support phone
number’ with 1,001-10,000 average hits. At the higher end, 7%
of the technical support phrases had moderately high levels of
popularity, e.g. ‘dell tech support’, ’microsoft support number’
with 10,001-100,000 hits per month on average, and 1.7% of
the technical support search phrases were highly searched for,
e.g. ‘lenovo support’ with greater than 100,000 hits per month
globally. As we can see, we have a fairly even distribution of
technical support search terms with varying levels of popularity
ranging from low to high (in relative terms).
One may expect that less popular search terms are prone
to manipulation in the context of both ADs and SRs, while
more popular ones are harder to manipulate due to competition,
making it more difficult for the technical support scammers to
promote their websites via bidding (in the case of ADs) or
SEO (in the case of SRs). To validate this, we measure the
number of total TSS URIs found per search phrase (referred
to as pollution level), as a function of the popularity of the
phrase. Since the popularity levels of phrases are gathered from
Google, we only consider the TSS URIs (both AD and SR as
seen on Google) to make a fair assessment. Figure 6c depicts
a box plot that captures the pollution levels for all search
phrases grouped by the popularity levels except the ones with
very low popularity. By comparing the median number of TSS
URIs (depicted by the red line(s)) from different popularity
bands, we witness that as the popularity level of a search
term increases, the pollution level (i.e. the absolute number
of TSS URIs), decreases. We can make several additional
observations: (i) there is definite pollution irrespective of the
popularity level: in other words, more than a single TSS URI
appeared in almost all of the technical support search queries
we considered, as can be seen from the floor of the first
quartile in every band; (ii) while many (∼50%) low popularity
search terms (e.g. those with 101-1000 hits per month) yielded
28 or more TSS URIs, there were outliers even among the
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Fig. 7: CDF of the network amplification factor, A, of final landing
TSS domains discovered using search listings.
high popularity search terms that accounted for the same or
even more number of TSS URIs; and lastly, (iii) the range in
the number of TSS URIs discovered per query varied more
widely in the case of low popularity terms as compared to
higher popularity terms. Overall, these results indicate that TSS
scammers are intent on pushing their target websites among
(i) high-impact results, in spite of the challenges in doing so,
while (ii) simultaneously picking low hanging fruits by widely
spreading their websites among the search listings associated
with less popular technical support search queries.
To effectively target victims, it is not merely enough to
make TSS URIs appear among the search results. It is also
important to make them appear high in the search rankings.
To measure this, we show the distribution of TSS SR URIs
based on their ranking/position among the search results for
different search engines. We use four brackets to classify the
TSS SR URIs based on its actual position: 1-25 position (high
rank), 26-50 position, 51-75 position and 76-100 position (low
rank). If the same URI appears in multiple search positions, for
example on different days, we pick and associate the higher of
the positions with the URI. We do this to reflect the worst-case
impact of a TSS SR URI. Thus, each unique URI is eventually
counted only once. Figure 6d summarizes our findings. We see
that all 5 search engines return TSS URIs that are crowding
out legitimate technical support websites by appearing high in
the rankings. This makes it hard to trust a high ranking URI as
legitimate. Bing had the highest percentage (30.4%) among all
its TSS URIs appearing in the top 25 search results, followed
by Yahoo (27.6%), Goentry (24.8%), search.1and1 (22.6%)
and Google (19.6%). Note that here we are not comparing the
absolute number of TSS URIs between the search engines.
TSS URIs are seen distributed across all position bands, again
pointing to the pervasive nature of the TSS pollution problem.
C. Network Amplification Efficacy
The network-level amplification approach did pose a num-
ber of challenges. The first challenge lies in the fact that
sometimes technical support websites are hosted on public
cloud infrastructure. Thus, the set Drhip−rhdnfor such domains
can yield an overwhelming number of domains to process for
the TSS webpage classifier. We avoid this by excluding rhip-
rhdn sets, Drhip−rhdn(d), having size greater than a reasonable
operator specified threshold, λ. The other challenge lies in the
fact that sometimes the webpages associated with the rhip-
rhdn domains, wd′ , are not retrievable. This could be because
the webpage is parked, taken down or expired. Further, even
the Internet archive may not have snapshots of the webpage
associated with the domain in the desired time window. In
such cases, we are forced to exclude the domain from further
consideration even when there is evidence of it being linked to
technical support scams, e.g. based on the domain name itself.
Using these heuristics, and dropping any domains having
amplification factor A(d) < 1, we are conservatively left with
only 2,623 domains in the Df−tss set that contributed to the
rhip-rhdn expansion set, Ef−tss. Figure 7 plots the cumulative
distribution of the amplification factor of these domains. As
we can see, around 60% domains had A(d) ≤ 50 while the
remaining 40% domains had A(d) > 50, with the maximum
A(d) value equal to 275. Note that there could be overlap
between the amplification sets, D′f−tss(d), for different d’s.
Also worth noting is the fact that having a low amplification
value does not necessarily mean that there are no other TSS
domains on the subnet as it could be that some of DNS records
associated with domains on the network were not previously
recorded/seen by the deployed sensors. With ISP scale DNS
records, the amplification values can potentially be much
greater. In all, the total number of unique FQDNs hosting TSS
content, |Ff−tss| = 9,221, with 3,996 TSS FQDNs coming
from the final landing websites in search listings and 5,225
additional TSS FQDNs discovered as a result of network-level
amplification. These 9,221 FQDNs mapped to 8,104 TLD+1
domains. Thus, even though amplification is non-uniform, it
helps in discovering domains that may not be visible by search
listings alone.
The network amplification process allowed us to identify
840 passive-type TSS domains co-located with one or more
aggressive TSS domains. This indicates that some of the
passive scams are operated by the same scammers who operate
the aggressive ones. This is likely part of a diversification
strategy where, depending upon the method of retrieving users,
scammers can show different types of pages: e.g. aggressive
ones for those involved in “malvertising” redirections and
passive ones for those that are already in the market for
technical support services.
D. Domain Infrastructure Analysis
In this section, we analyze all the domain names associated
with technical support scams discovered by our system. This
includes the final landing domains that actually host TSS con-
tent as well as support domains, whose purpose is to participate
in black hat SEO or serve as the redirection infrastructure.
Most abused TLDs: First, we analyze the final landing
TSS domain names. Table III shows the most abused TLDs
in this category. The .com TLD appeared in 25.56% final
landing TSS domain names, making it the most abused TLD.
Next, 16.21% domain names had .xyz as the TLD, making it
the second most abused TLD. .info, .online and .us each had
greater than 6% domain names registered to them completing
the top five in this category. Other popular gTLDs included
.website, .site, .tech, .support, while the ccTLDs included .in,
.tk, .co and .tf. Among the support domains, the top three
most popular TLDs were .xyz, .win and .space. Although .xyz
was once again very popular like in the case of the final
landing TSS domains, both .win and .space were exclusive
TLD %
com 25.56
xyz 16.21
info 7.62
online 6.78
us 6.34
net 5.91
org 4.86
in 4.44
website 4.10
site 3.69
tk 2.03
tech 2.12
co 1.89
tf 1.67
support 1.44
others 5.34
Total 100
TABLE III: Most abused top-level domains (TLDs) used in final-
landing TSS websites.
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Fig. 8: Lifetime of different types of TSS domains
to this category. We also compared the TLDs associated with
the final landing TSS domain names with those discovered
by ROBOVIC, the system developed by Miramirkhani et
al. [54]. For an overlapping data collection period between
January to March of 2017. We found that 4 out of the top 10
TLDs associated with TSS domains served by abusing domain-
parking and ad-based URL shortening services were different
from those discovered in our dataset. The TLDs that were
rarely visible in our dataset included .club, .pw, .trade and .top.
Thus, there are differences with respect to the preference of
domain name registration between these two different tactics.
Domains Lifetimes: Next, we look at the lifespan of final
landing and support domains. The lifetime of a final landing
TSS domain is derived by computing the difference between
the earliest and most recent date that the domain was seen
hosting TSS content. This computation is based on data from
our crawler and the Internet archive. The lifetime of a support
domain is derived based on earliest and the most recent date
that the domain was seen redirecting to a final-landing TSS
domain. Figure 8 plots the lifetimes of these two categories
of domains with the final landing domains split up into the
passive and aggressive types. Final landing TSS domains of
the aggressive type had a median lifetime of ∼9 days with
close to 40% domains having a lifetime between 10-100 days,
and the remaining ∼10% domains having a lifetime greater
than a 100 days. In comparison, final landing TSS domains
of the passive type had a much longer median lifetime of
∼100 days. Some of the domains in this category had a
Blacklist Name Coverage (in %) Type
Domain Phone Number
FQDN TLD+1
Malwarebytes TSS List 18.1% n/a 20.3% Telephony BL
Google Safe Browsing 9.6% 5.2% n/a Traditional DBL
800notes.com 14.2% n/a 16.8% Telephony BL
VirusTotal 22.6% 10.8% n/a Traditional DBL
Others+ 5.3% 3.4% n/a Traditional DBL
Cumulative 26.8% 12.5% 26.1%
TABLE IV: Overlap between final landing TSS domains with popular
public blacklists. +includes Malware Domains List, sans, Spamhaus,
itmate, sagadc, hphosts, abuse.ch and Malc0de DB.
lifetime of over 300 days. Clearly, passive TSS domains outlast
those of the aggressive type. The reason for this could be
attributed to the nature of these domains, with the aggressive
domains being clear candidates for reporting/take-down and
the passive ones getting the benefit of doubt (as they tend
to appear legitimate and conduct the fraud mainly via the
phone channel). Irrespective of the reason, it suggests that
passive TSS websites have the potential to do harm for long
time periods. In comparison, support domains had a median
lifetime of ∼60 days, with ∼33% domains having a lifetime
greater than 100 days. Generally, this is a longer lifetime
relative to final landing TSS domains of the aggressive type. It
indicates that the domains that are used for the sole purpose of
black hat SEO or redirection are relatively stable and reusable
(due to the long-lived nature), helping their cause to redirect
to final landing TSS domains when desired and yet remain
unnoticed. As we discuss later, in addition to blacklisting the
final landing domains, take down/blacklisting of these support
domains would lead to a more effective defense in breaking
parts of the TSS abuse infrastructure.
Overlap with Blacklists: Using domains and phone num-
bers from a large number of public blacklists (PBL) [24], [1],
[15], [38], [23], [33], [32], [19], [29], [16], [2], [22], we verify
if and when a TSS resource appeared in any of the PBLs. We
collected data from these lists beginning Jan 2014 up until
April 2017, encompassing the AD/SR data collection period,
which allows us to make fair comparisons.
We start with 800notes.com, which is a crowdsourced
directory of unknown callers. It consists of complaints by
users who post about telephony scams, not just technical
support scams. We extracted phone numbers and domain
names appearing in the complaints. We find that only 14.2%
of final landing TSS FQDNs were reported in the complaints.
Next, we look at a more exclusive TSS blacklist released
by Malwarebytes. These public blacklists are specific to TSS
and are regularly updated. According to their website, they
use both crowdsourced and internal investigations to generate
the list. Over time there were 4,949 unique FQDNs and 1,705
phone numbers listed on the list. We found that 18.1% of the
final landing TSS FQDNs identified by our system were also
listed in these lists. As for phone numbers, 20.3% from our
TSS dataset were also seen in the list.
Next, we queried the domains against the Google Safe
Browsing list using their API. We found that 9.6% final
landing TSS FQDNs and 5.2% second-level domains (TLD+1)
from those identified by our system as fake technical support
were also listed in Google’s system and were all labeled as
“Social Engineering.” Since Google does not have a public
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Fig. 9: Distribution based on the year of registration of TSS phone
numbers.
list of abusive phone numbers, we leave the corresponding
field blank. Lastly, we checked PBLs that typically include
botnet C&C domains, malware sites and other unsafe domains
serving malicious content. These include all the lists mentioned
before except 800notes, Malwarebytes TSS list, and Google
safe browsing list. We find that together these cover just 5.3%
FQDNs and 3.4% TLDs from our list.
Next, we check the domains against VirusTotal which is
comprised of feeds from multiple AV engines. We found
that 22.6% final landing TSS FQDNs and 10.8% TLD+1s
listed on it. While this list gave the greatest coverage in TSS
domain name blacklisting, we still found significant scope for
improvement in terms of coverage. Moreover, it is still lower
(in relative terms) as compared to the findings by Miramirkhani
et al. [54] where close to 64% of their TSS domain set was
listed on VirusTotal. We suspect that this is in part due to
some of the passive TSS domains which largely go undetected.
Overall, these results are not very surprising since these are
traditional blacklists whose intelligence is targeted towards
other types of abusive domains, such as, botnet domains. A
similar outcome in terms of the efficacy of these lists has been
reported in an SMS-spam domain abuse [64].
Cumulatively, these lists cover only 26.8% FQDNs, that
were found to be involved in TSS by our system. Moreover, out
of the 26.8% blacklisted FQDNs, 8.2% were already present
in one of the lists when our system detected them, while
the remaining 18.6% were detected by our system ∼26 days
in advance, on average. Moreover, when we cross-listed the
support domains against these lists, we found that <1% of
those were present in any of these lists. This reinforces the
point made in Section III-D regarding blacklisting support do-
mains for effective defense against TSS. Table IV summarizes
these findings. This analysis suggests that while exclusive TSS
blacklists are a good idea alongside traditional PBLs, there is
much scope for improvement by detecting these domains using
an automated system such as ours.
E. Phone Number Analysis
Once a victim calls the phone number listed on the
fake TSS website, a call center operator uses voice-based
interactions to social engineer the victim to pay up for the
fake/unwanted technical support services. Based on data from
tollfreenumbers.com, we conduct an analysis of the toll-free
numbers listed on the TSS webpages. We look at two attributes
associated with each toll-free number, while it was being
abused: (i) the age of the toll-free number, and (ii) the toll-free
number provider. We conduct this analysis for 3,365 unique
toll-free numbers found on technical support scam webpages.
Final land-
ing domains
Support do-
mains
IPs Phone Num-
bers
Clustering Label(s) Sample Domains
662 452 216 521 microsoft virus windows call-po-1-877-884-6922.xzz0082-global-wind0ws.website,
virusinfection0x225.site
232 0 38 112 amazon kindle phone kindlesupport.xyz
199 172 112 199 microsoft technician vista
windows
talktoyour-technician.xyz
91 43 134 46 error microsoft threat error-go-pack-akdam-0x00009873.website, suspiciousactivi-
tydetectedpleasecallon18778489010tollfree.*.lacosta.cf
82 0 21 43 key office product officesetupzone.xyz
76 0 36 38 antivirus norton nortonsetup.online
75 0 18 28 browser firefox firefoxtechnicalsupport.com
68 0 23 36 gmail login gmailsupportphonenumber.org
55 0 41 51 chrome google chromesupportphonenumber.com
48 22 42 47 apple risk apple-at-risk.com, apple-atrisk.com
42 0 10 2 code error network networkservicespaused.site, 04cve76nterrorcode.site
36 0 12 15 customer facebook service facebooksupportphonenumber.com
TABLE V: Selected large campaigns, as measured by the number of final landing TSS domains, identified by the clustering module. Labels are
ordered alphabetically and common words across campaigns such as ‘call’, ‘support’, ‘toll’ and ‘free’ have been omitted.
Registration Date/Age and Providers: The age of a
toll-free number gives us an idea of when the number was
purchased and registered by the technical support scammer
who abuses it. We estimate this by fetching data that tells
us the year in which the number last changed ownership and
whether it is in active use. With both these factors combined,
we can estimate the earliest possible time (not the exact time)
when the organization or individual responsible for the account
to which the toll-free number is linked could have potentially
begun the abuse. Figure 9 plots the relative percentage of active
toll-free numbers based on the year in which it last changed
ownership. Close to 16% toll free numbers were registered in
2014, 24.4% in 2015, 28.7% in 2016 and 13.5% in early 2017,
totaling to 82.6% of all toll free numbers in the period between
Jan 2014 - Mar 2017. We were unable to find any information
for 4.9%, and the remaining 12.5% were registered prior to
2014. The relatively recent timing of these registrations and
their volume suggests that search-and-ad abuse TSS scams are
a more recent phenomenon and are on the rise.
Even though the biggest provider of TSS-related toll-
free phone numbers is WilTel Communications, contrary to
the findings of Miramirkhani et al. [54], who find that four
providers account for more than 90% of the phone numbers,
we observe a much larger pool of providers, each responsible
for a smaller fraction of numbers. The top four providers ac-
count for less than 40% of the identified TSS phone numbers.
The reason for this disparity is likely because our system
identifies scams and scammers that ROBOVIC misses who
clearly have their own preferences for obtaining toll-free phone
numbers (we discuss this more in Section V).
Presence in Complaints: Among phone numbers found
on TSS websites identified by our system, 16.8% toll-free
numbers were present in the complaint reports. Also, 26.1%
were cumulatively present across all blacklists that included
phone numbers.
F. Campaigns
The Clustering module (Section II-F) produces clusters
consisting of final landing domains that share similar net-
work and application features. Table V lists some of the
major campaigns attributed by our system and the resources
associated with them. First, although TSS are notoriously
synonymous with Microsoft and its products, we found that
many other brands are also targets of TSS campaigns. These
brands include Apple, Amazon, Google and Facebook among
others. Microsoft, however, remains on top of the most abused
brands with 4 out of the top 5 TSS campaigns targeting
Microsoft and its products. Second, we observed that TSS
campaigns tend to advertise services targeted at particular
brands and its line of products. For example, certain TSS
campaigns advertise services only for Gmail accounts or
Norton Antivirus or Firefox browser or the Windows OS. The
outcome from the victim’s perspective can vary depending on
the product: examples include credential theft, genuine product
key phishing, browser compromise and remote hijacking of the
OS in the aforementioned cases respectively. This behavior is
likely because the call center agents are trained to specialize
in technical aspects associated with a particular type of pro-
duct/service which could be a device (e.g. kindle), software
(e.g. browser) or OS (e.g. Windows Vista) rather than generic
technical support. Such a brand based view can be used to
alert companies about campaigns targeting them so that they
in turn can take appropriate action in stemming the campaign
or alert their users about it.
The identified campaigns allow us to study the relationship
between domains and the phone numbers advertised by them.
We find that the churn rate in phone numbers is comparable to
the churn rate of domain names for certain campaigns while
there also exist campaigns where the churn rate in phone
numbers is very low as compared to the domains names.
Evidence of both cases is present in Table V. The first, third
and fourth campaigns listed in the table represent a N-N
relationship between domain names and phone numbers i.e.
each final-landing domain associated with the campaigns is
likely to advertise a different phone number. However due to
the routing mechanism of the toll-free numbers, the calls to
them may end up in the same call center. On the contrary,
the second to last campaign depicts a N-2 relationship be-
tween domain names and phone numbers with 42 final-landing
domains sharing just 2 toll-free numbers. By analyzing the
clusters produced, we find that the presence of support domains
is not ubiquitous. Only certain campaigns tend to make use of
support domains. Furthermore, these campaigns are associated
with SEO behavior and tend to be of the aggressive type.
In total, 368 clusters were produced after both network and
application level hierarchical clustering. Next, we present case
studies of two campaigns to highlight TSS tactics.
IV. CASE STUDIES
To gain deeper insights into TSS abuse infrastructure, we
discuss two specific case studies. The first one illustrates the
use of support domains for black hat SEO and the second one
demonstrates the use of browser hijacking to serve TSS ads.
A. Black Hat SEO TSS Campaign
In this case study, we analyze the largest TSS campaign
from Table V to highlight the technique used to promote the
TSS websites and the infrastructure used to grow and sustain
the campaign over time. The campaign primarily targeted
Bing.com users. It consisted of 452 support domains, 662
final landing domains which mapped to 216 IPs over time
and advertised 521 unique phone numbers. The campaign was
first detected on 04/16/2016 and was active as recently as
03/30/2017. This is based on the first and last date on which
the domains belonging to this campaign were identified by our
system and added to the TSS dataset. Video evidence of this
exclusive campaign, with its unique and previously unreported
(to the best of our knowledge) characteristics and can be found
via the URL: https://vimeo.com/229219769. To view the video,
one would require the access password: ArXiv2017.
A search for “microsoft tech support”, for instance, would
yield a TSS support domain such as zkhubm.win among the
SRs. Clicking on the SR would redirect the user’s browser to
a final landing TSS domain. The domain then uses aggressive
scareware tactics to convince the victim about an error in their
Windows machine. Then the victim is coerced into contacting
the TSS call center. The social engineering and monetization
would then take place over the phone channel, thus completing
a typical TSS. Table VI lists some of the support domains and
the final landing domains to which they redirect.
SEO Technique: The support domains use black hat SEO
techniques sometimes referred to as spamdexing to manipulate
the SRs. Specifically, the support domains seen on the search
page act as doorway pages to final landing TSS domains.
However, they use cloaking techniques such as text stuffing and
link stuffing, consisting of technical support related keywords
and links, to hide their real intent from search engine crawlers
and get promoted up the SR rankings. Figure 10a shows what
a crawler/user would see when visiting a support domain if
the Referer header does not indicate that the originating click
happened on a search results page.
IP Infrastructure Insights: Figure 10b shows the spread
of the IPv4 address space and how domains in this campaign
map to it. We plot the fraction of support and final landing
TSS domains as a function of the IP address space and
make the following observations: (i) IP space used by support
domains is quite different and decoupled from where final
landing TSS domains are located, and ii) while the address
space for fake technical support domains is fragmented, the
entire set of support domains are concentrated in a single
subnet, 185.38.184.0/24. IP to AS mapping for the subnet
points to AS# 13213 under the name UK2NET-AS, GB. The
ASN has country code listed as ME, Montenegro. The IP-
Geo location data too points to an ISP in Montenegro, Budva.
In contrast, IP’s associated with final landing TSS domains
pointed to different AS#’s 31815, Media Temple, Inc, AS#
13335, Cloudflare and AS# 26496 GO-DADDY-COM-LLC
Support Domain Final-landing Domain
zkhubm.win err365.com, jo0dy-gmm-
0003210.website
03d.gopaf.xyz supportcorner.co, xoaodkfnm.tech, at-
torneylowerguide.xyz
gmzlpx.space web-server-threat-warning0x58z2.us
utwwxs.win call-po-1-877-884-6922.xzz0082-
global-wind0ws.website, call-kl-1-877-
884-6922.jo0dy-gmm-0003210.website
lgncbq.win virusinfection0x225.site
TABLE VI: Some of the support and final-landing domains
seen in the largest TSS campaign from our dataset.
based on IP to AS mapping data. They were geographically
located in the US based on IP-Geo data. The fragmentation in
the hosting infrastructure for the final landing TSS domains
gives the technical support scammers a reliable way to spread
their assets. The decoupling of the infrastructure between
support domains and final landing TSS domains indicates that
the technical support scammers are using the support domains
as a “service” to offload the work of SEO. These support
domains could well serve other types of scams and command
a price for their specialization at a later time or in parallel.
Finally, from a defense perspective, focusing takedown efforts
on these intermediate domains will likely have a larger effect
that the takedown of individual final TSS domains.
Although this campaign is largely of the aggressive type,
none of the domains we found appear in the data we received
from Miramirkhani et al. [54] (Section V). We believe this is
because it is purely a search-based campaign which does not
rely on malvertising. Thus, even for aggressive TSS webpages,
our system is able to find new abuse infrastructure that cannot
be found by previously explored techniques.
B. Hijacking the Browser to Serve TSS ADs: Goentry.com
Goentry.com has been linked with browser hijacking where
malicious software changes the browser’s settings without user
permission to inject unwanted advertisements into the user’s
browser [28], [13]. We noticed Goentry.com serving TSS ADs
during the initial stages of this research and decided to probe it
further. We use this case study to provide insights into evolving
tactics being used by TSS actors.
Website Content: The homepage of goentry.com is a simple
page with a Goentry logo, a search bar and a tagline “Goentry
protects you from Government/NSA Spying on your Searches.”
The output for a search query contains ADs on the top and
right side of the results page, related search terms followed
by search results. The website’s root directory reveals content
related to Goentry’s SEO and website design services that
includes their contact, toll-free number.
<div c l a s s =” r ow con t en t ”>
<div c l a s s =” t i t l e ”>
<a href =”http://54080586.r.msn.com/?ld=d3S-92sO4zd0 1KziRqDxw8jVUCUygAQNyepQiT8UsMmF8rSDffo
sf83BC5WlJWn2gK0Grxnx4w a53hJnGg13 6QTIsq8I79L4EZOQs84G9tecML NYlDCxeBCFVJrg3jgU
hDJNROMpyuqVwjWBfKjGSsnak&u=www.gosearch770.xyz%2findex.php” t a r g e t =” b l ank ”>
Com</ a>
</ div>
<div c l a s s =” d e s c r i p t i o n ”>Browse Now For Com Onl i ne</ div>
<div c l a s s =” l i n k ”>
<div c l a s s =” l i n k−l e f t ” s t y l e =” f l o a t : l e f t ; ”> gosearch770.xyz</ div>
</ div>
</ div>
Based on the source, we observed the common use of the
Universal Event Tracking (UET) [37] tags as trackers which
allow the scammer to measure analytics such as the number
of people that visited a specific page or a section of the
(a) Screenshots demonstrating Black-hat SEO behavior by the support domain
zkhubm.win. Left side of the figure shows a text-stuffed page when the domain
is visited by a vanilla crawler. The right side shows the final-landing domain
err365.com after redirection when the corresponding SR is clicked.
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Fig. 10: Measurements related to a large black hat SEO campaign.
website, amount of time they spent on the website etc. For
example, the following code snippet corresponding to an AD
seen on goentry.com, gosearch770.xyz, is tracked with UET tag
id 54080586, and acts as a doorway page which redirects to
fake technical support websites such as error-error-error-2.xyz,
critical-warning-message-2.xyz, portforyou.xyz and many oth-
ers, while monitoring the site analytics.
Server-side Scripts: Our initial suspicion was that the search
service is either using readily available APIs such as Google’s
Custom Search Engine to power their searches or it was
running customized scripts. Using the source of the page,
we found references to a server-side PHP script. Due to
configuration errors from the side of the scammers, we were
able to obtain parts of that script which revealed that the
search-results page would react to the presence of certain
keywords by adding tech-support ads to the returned page (e.g.
when the users would search for the word “ice” the returned
page would include ads about tech-support and the removal of
a specific strain of ransomware called “the ICE Cyber Crime
Center virus” [36]).
Domain Registration and IP: The website’s registration
records show that it was created on 01/22/2014 to an orga-
nization called Macrofix Technical Services Private Limited
which is associated to the website macrofix.com. This
website advertises techical support services and is known to
be a scam [21].
V. DISCUSSION AND LIMITATIONS
Comparison with Past TSS studies: Given the recent work
of Miramirkhani et al. [54], who analyzed technical support
scams and proposed a system for their discovery (ROBOVIC),
in this section, we compare our results with the findings of
that previous study, and show that, while there is an overlap
in our findings, our TSS-discovery system allows us to find
scammers that were completely ignored by Miramirkhani et
al.’s ROBOVIC.
For the purpose of a direct comparison, we were able to
obtain data from Miramirkhani et al. for the period Jan-Mar
2017, which overlaps with the second time window of data
collection in our work. Specifically, we received a list of 2,768
FQDNs discovered by their tool (2441 second-level domains),
882 toll-free phone numbers and 1,994 IP addresses. Upon
intersecting these sets with our own data, we found 0/2,768
FQDNs and 0/2,441 second-level domains that were common.
Moreover, in terms of server and telephony infrastructure, we
discovered that the two datasets had 92/1,994 common IP
addresses of servers hosting TSS and 5/882 common toll-
free phone numbers. We also discovered frequent use of
“noindex” [10] meta tags in the HTML source of webpages
associated with domains in Miramirkhani et. al. dataset which
was noticeably missing from webpages in our dataset.
Given this near-zero intersection of the two datasets, we
argue that our approach is discovering TSS infrastructure that
ROBOVIC is unable to find. Next to discovering aggressive
tech support pages that ROBOVIC missed, a core contribution
of our work is focusing on “passive” TSS which manifest
mostly as organic search results. These pages are unlikely to
be circulated over malvertising channels: a benign-looking tech
support page is unlikely to capture the attention of users who
were never searching for technical support in the first place.
Since public blacklists are still unable to capture the vast
majority of TSS (Section III-D), our work complements the
work of Miramirkhani et al. Specifically, by taking advantage
of our system, blacklist curators would double the number of
TSS domains, IP addresses, and phone numbers that could be
added to their blacklists.
Limitations: Like all real-world systems, our work is not
without its limitations. Our choice of using PhantomJS for
crawling search results and ads can, in principle, be detected by
scammers who can use this knowledge to evade our monitors.
We argue that replacing PhantomJS with a real browser is
a relatively straightforward task which merely requires more
hardware resources. Similarly, our choice of keeping our
crawler stateless could lead to evasions which would again be
avoided if one used a real, Selenium-driven, browser. Finally,
while we provide clustering information for the discovered
TSS, in the absence of ground truth, we are unable to guarantee
the accuracy of this clustering or to attribute these clusters back
to specific threat actors.
VI. RELATED WORK
As mentioned throughout this paper, Miramirkhani et
al. [54] performed the first analysis of technical support
scams (TSS) by focusing on scams delivered via malvertising
channels and interacting with scammers to identify their modus
operandi. In recent work, Sahin et al. [60] investigated the
effectiveness of chatbots in conversing with phone scammers
(thereby limiting the time that scammers have available for
real users).
The use of both the Internet and telephony channels to
conduct cross-channel attacks is enabled by technologies that
led to the convergence of these channels. Researchers have
identified the evolving role of telephony and how phone
numbers play a central role in a wide range of scams, including
Nigerian scams, phishing, phone-verified accounts, and SMS
spam [64], [48], [64], [47], [66], [56], [49], [43].
In addition to telephony-specific work, researchers have
analyzed a range of underground ecosystems detailing their
infrastructure and identifying the parties involved, in addition
to potential pressure points [55], [57], [52], [63]. Since TSS is
a type of underground ecosystem, we borrowed ideas found in
prior work, such as, the appropriate setting of User Agent and
Referrer crawler parameters used by Leontiadis et al. during
their analysis of drug scams [52] to make requests appear as
if they originated from a real user clicking on a search result.
Also, search-redirection based drug scams discovered by them
rely on compromising high-reputation websites while the TSS
scams discovered by our system rely on black hat SEO and
malicious advertisement tactics.
Finally, there have been numerous studies that cluster
abuse/spam infrastructure and campaigns based on URLs [65],
IP infrastructure [41], [42] and content [40]. Similar hierar-
chical clustering techniques too have been shown effective in
multiple contexts [64], [62], [51], [50]. In terms of countermea-
sures, prior work has shown the ineffectiveness of traditional
blacklists in protecting services, such as instant messaging
(IM) [59], and social media [46], [65]. Unfortunately, until
blacklist curators adopt systems such as our own, blacklists
will also be ineffective against technical support scams.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we analyzed Technical Support Scams (TSS)
by focusing on two new sources of scams: organic search
results and ads shown next to these results. Using care-
fully constructed search queries and network amplification
techniques, we developed a system that was able to find
thousands of active TSS. We identify the presence of long-
lived support domains which shield the final scam domains
from search engines and shed light on the SEO tactics of
scammers. In addition to aggressive scams, our system allowed
us to discover thousands of passive TSS pages which appear
professional, and yet display phone numbers which lead to
scammers. We showed that our system discovers thousands
of TSS-related domains, IP addresses, and phone numbers
that are missed by prior work, and would therefore offer a
marked increase of protection when incorporated into systems
generating blacklists of malicious infrastructure.
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APPENDIX
( i n t ) 34 => a r r a y (
’ Goodie ’ => a r r a y (
’ id ’ => ’56 ’ ,
’ uid ’ => ’1 ’ ,
’ examp l e query ’ => ’ i ce ’ ,
’ d e s c r i p t i o n ’ => ’ ’ ,
’pattern’ =¿ ’/ice/i’,
’ code ’ => ’ $h tml = <<<EOT
<div c l a s s =” s e a r c h r e s u l t s ”>
<div c l a s s =” custom−ad ”>
<div c l a s s =” a d t i t l e ”>
Ads r e l a t e d t o <span c l a s s =” bo ld ”>ICE Vi ru s</ span>
</ div>
<div c l a s s =” row”>
<div c l a s s=” f av i co n ”><img src =
” h t t p s : / / g e t f a v i c o n . ap p s p o t . com / h t t p : / / www. p cv i r u s r emove . com” he i g h t=” 16”
width=
”16 ” a l t =” Fav i con ” /></ div>
<div c l a s s=” r ow con t en t ”>
<div c l a s s =” t i t l e ”>
<a href =
”https://goentry.com/r.php?u=http://www.pcvirusremove.com/ice-cyber-crime-center-virus-
removal/”¿¡b¿ICE¡/b¿ Cyber ¡b¿Virus Removal¡/b¿ - Call 1-877-635-8168 for
Support.¡/a¿
</d i v>
<div c l a s s =” d e s c r i p t i o n ”>
Expert ICE Virus Removal Help 24x7
</ div>
<div c l a s s =” l i n k ”>
<div c l a s s =” l i n k−l e f t ” s t y l e =” f l o a t : l e f t ; ”>
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